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Abstract
We build an intergenerational transfer model in which an adult child 
provides elder care to his parents and monetary transfers to his children 
based on his own income. Under an assumption that the adult child is 
concerned about his own future care, we make the following theoretical 
prediction: an adult child provides elder care for his parents and monetary 
transfer to his children based on monetary transfer from his elderly 
parents only if the adult child expects that his child will provide him future 
elder care. Empirical findings based on the sample drawn from the Health 
and Retirement Study are consistent with the theoretical prediction. Our 
findings indicate that the expectation of adult children regarding whether 
their children will provide future elder care critically determines their 
decisions regarding the provision of elder care to their elderly parents and 
monetary transfers to their children.
Keywords：Elder care, Intergenerational transfers, Altruism
１．Introduction
     Family members play an important role in elder care. For a single 
elderly person with care needs, adult children are the primary care 
providers; the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012) reports that 40 million 
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people provide care to an aging parent in the US.
     Existing studies have shown that adult children with their own children 
are less likely to provide care for their elderly parents than adult children 
without their own children. However, most adult children have their own 
children; as the term “sandwiched generation” implies, adult children are 
struggling to strike the balance between providing elder care and bringing 
up their children. In the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), among adult 
children who have one surviving parent with care needs and have at least 
one child, we find that adult children who transfer money to their children 
are more likely to provide care for their elderly parents compared with 
those who do not transfer money to their children. Existing studies are 
unable to explain this observation. Why do such adult children with their 
own children provide elder care?
     The purpose of this study is to provide a mechanism by which adult 
children who transfer money to their children are more likely to provide 
elder care. This study takes account of adult children's concern for their 
own future care and builds an intergenerational transfer model in which 
an adult child provides elder care to his parents and monetary transfers 
to his children based on his own income. Under an assumption that the 
adult child is concerned about his own future care, we make the following 
theoretical prediction: an adult child provides elder care for his parents 
and monetary transfer to his children based on monetary transfer from his 
elderly parents only if the adult child expects that his child will provide him 
future elder care. The prediction shows that the adult child's expectation 
of future elder care from his child determines the effect of the increase in 
monetary transfer from the elderly parents to the adult child on the adult child's 
elder care provision to his parents and monetary transfer to his children.
Two-Sided Transfers from Adult Children of Elderly Persons　Azuma・Fujiu
－3－
     Adult children who expect to receive future elder care from their own 
children do not need to save for their own future elder care. Therefore, they 
will provide more elder care to their parents and more monetary transfer 
to their children for the altruistic concern about their elderly parents and 
their children when adult children receive more monetary transfer from 
their elderly parents. On the other hand, adult children who do not expect 
to receive future elder care from their own children need to save for their 
own future elder care. Therefore, although adult children are altruistic to 
their elderly parents and their children, adult children increase neither 
elder care to their elderly parents nor monetary transfer to their children 
when adult children receive more monetary transfer from their elderly 
parents; adult children end up using the monetary transfer from their 
elderly parents for saving for their own future elder care.
     For our empirical analysis, a sample of adult children who have one 
surviving parent with care needs and who have at least one child is drawn 
from the HRS. We test the theoretical prediction on the adult children's 
provision of elder care to their parents and monetary transfers to their 
children simultaneously because the adult children simultaneously 
determine the levels of elder care to their parents and the amounts of 
monetary transfers to their children. The dependence of elder care and 
monetary transfers on observable family characteristics is estimated using 
the recursive bivariate probit model. Among adult children who expect 
future elder care from their children, we find that adult children increase 
the provision of elder care to their parents and the transfer of money to 
their children when they receive greater monetary transfers from their 
elderly parents. In contrast, among adult children who do not expect future 
elder care from their children, we find that adult children increase neither 
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the provision of elder care to their parents nor monetary transfers to their 
children when they receive greater monetary transfers from their elderly 
parents. Therefore, our findings suggest that the expectation of adult 
children regarding whether their children will provide future elder care for 
them critically determines their decisions regarding the provision of elder 
care to their parents and monetary transfers to their children.
     Our study is situated in the literature that has examined the 
determinants of adult children's care provision for their elderly parents. 
Adult children's characteristics are critical determinants of their care 
provision. Among the existing studies, for example, Bernheim, Shleifer, 
and Summers (1985) show that the number of siblings of adult children 
influences the care provision; however, they do not take account of the 
presence of children of the adult children. Brown (2006) shows that an 
adult child with his own children is less likely to provide care to his elderly 
parent. As discussed above, we find in the HRS that adult children who 
transfer money to their children are more likely to provide elder care 
compared with those who do not transfer money to their children. Existing 
studies are unable to explain this phenomenon. This is because the existing 
studies do not take account of adult children's concern for their own future 
elder care; therefore, the children of adult children are not considered to be 
caregivers for the adult children.
     This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical 
model, and our sample from the HRS is discussed in Section 3. In Section 
4, the hypotheses of interest are tested, and our findings are discussed. Our 
conclusions are presented in Section 5.
２．Model
     In this section, we consider an economy in which there exist three 
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successive generations in the same period: an elderly parent, an adult child, 
and a grandchild. An adult child is altruistic to his child (grandchild), but 
whether he is altruistic to his elderly parent or not depends on the amount 
of transfer from the elderly parent when he was a child. We consider a case 
in which an adult child is altruistic to the elderly parent. In other words, 
the adult child is concerned for the well-being of the grandchild, the elderly 
parent, and himself in his old age.
     In period t, the three generations behave as follows. First, the adult 
child determines consumption for himself, monetary transfer to the 
grandchild, care for his elderly parent, and savings for his own future care 
based on his income. Second, the grandchild decides whether he is going to 
be altruistic to the adult child or not, based on an amount of transfer from 
the adult child. An altruistic grandchild provides a positive amount of elder 
care to the adult child in period t+1; a nonaltruistic grandchild provides 
no elder care to the adult child in period t+1. Third, the elderly parent 
transfers money to the adult child if he expects that this monetary transfer 
induces the adult child to provide an additional amount of elder care. Then, 
if the adult child receives the monetary transfer from the elderly parent, 
the adult child divides this transfer into consumption for him, monetary 
transfer to the grandchild, the amount of care for the elderly parent, and 
savings for his own future care. At the same time, the adult child observes 
whether the grandchild is altruistic to the adult child or not, that is, 
whether the adult child will receive care from the grandchild in period t+1.
(1) The adult child's first choice
    We consider the first choice of the adult child who is altruistic to his 
elderly parent as well as the grandchild in period t. The adult child 
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gains a utility from his own consumption, xt, his monetary transfer to 
the grandchild, xt+1, and his elderly parent's utility, vt. The utility of the 
elderly parent vt is determined by an amount of care that the elderly parent 
receives, ct. A utility function for the adult child is represented by W (xt, 
xt+1, atv(ct)), where at is an indicator for an altruism from the adult child to 
the elderly parent. In period t-1, the adult child decided whether he was 
going to be altruistic to the elderly parent or not, based on the amount of a 
transfer that the elderly parent provided to the adult child. We consider the 
case where the adult child is altruistic to the elderly parent; that is, at =1. 
The adult child provides a positive amount of care to the elderly parent.
     The adult child also gains utility from his own care in the future. We 
denote his own future care by ct+1 and his utility from it by v(ct+1). Denote 
the amount of care that the adult child expects the grandchild to provide 
by c-. When an adult child is altruistic to his elderly parent, the adult child 
would expect his child to be altruistic to the adult child as well. Therefore, 
we assume that the adult child who is altruistic to the elderly parent 
expects that the grandchild provides a positive amount of elder care to the 
adult child; that is, c- > 0. When the adult child purchases market-provided 
care for himself by mt+1 in period t+1, the total amount of elder care for him 
in period t+1 will be represented by ct+1 = c- +mt+1.
     The adult child provides care to the elderly parent, ct, and the provision 
of ct costs wt per hour. We assume that he has T hours. An optimization 
problem for the adult child is represented as
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where pt+1 is a price of market-provided care in period t+1, and δ is the 
rate of time preference and satisfies 0<δ<1. By the first-order condition for 
this optimization problem, we obtain that
and
where W2 is the derivative of W(∙,x,∙) in x and W3 is the derivative of W(∙,∙,v) 
in v. Note that, in the first-order condition (2), the adult child expects to 
receive a positive amount of elder care from the altruistic grandchild; that 
is, c- > 0.
(2) The grandchild's choice
    We consider the behavior of the grandchild in period t. In period t, the 
grandchild is too young to earn income. He gains a utility from his own 
consumption in period t. The grandchild cannot cover this cost; thus, 
monetary transfer from the adult child covers it.
    The grandchild decides whether he is going to be altruistic to the adult 
child or not, based on the amount of monetary transfer from the adult child. 
Denote by at+1 an indicator for altruism from the grandchild to the adult 
child. An altruistic grandchild provides a positive amount of elder care to 
the adult child in period t+1; a nonaltruistic grandchild provides no elder 
care to the adult child in period t+1. We assume that there is a threshold 
of transfer from the adult child to the grandchild,  x- , that the grandchild 
becomes altruistic to the adult child as long as the transfer from the adult 
child is equal to or above this threshold, xt+1 ≥ x-. The grandchild's decision 
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on altruism is represented by
where the level of  x-  differs across grandchildren.
     We denote by u (xt+1, at+1) the utility for a grandchild in period t. This 
utility function satisfies that u1>0 and u11<0 and that if x ≥ x-, u(x,1)≥u(x,0); 
otherwise, u(x,1)<u(x,0). １
(3) The elderly parent's choice and the adult child's second choice
     An elderly parent needs care in period t. The amount of care that the 
elderly parent receives consists of market-provided care and elder care from 
the adult child, ct. The elder care from the adult child satisfies the condition
where at = 1 if the adult child is altruistic to the elderly parent; at = 
0, otherwise. The elderly parent treats at as a parameter. It would be 
unrealistic to assume that the elderly parent is able to manipulate at. The 
adult child's choice of ct is determined by the income of the adult child, wtT, 
and expected care that the grandchild will provide to the adult child in 
period t+1, c-. The adult child who is altruistic to the elderly parent expects 
that the grandchild provides a positive amount of elder care to him, c- >0.
    When the grandchild is altruistic to the adult child, the grandchild will 
actually provide a positive amount of elder care to the adult child; that 
is, c- > 0. The adult child who expects to receive future elder care from the 
１ While the at+1 takes binominal values in this study, it takes continuous values in 
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985).
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grandchild does not need to save for his own future elder care. Equation (3) 
shows that the marginal utility of ct equals the marginal utility of mt+1, and 
it implies that the marginal utility of xt+1 equals the marginal utility of mt+1 
by (1). Suppose that the adult child receives more monetary transfer from 
the elderly parent, gt, and the adult child's budget constraint is increased to 
wtT+gt. Then, the adult child will increase elder care to the elderly parent, 
ct, from the altruistic concern for the elderly parent. Moreover, as equation 
(1) implies, the adult child will also increase monetary transfer to the 
grandchild, xt+1, from the altruistic concern for the grandchild.
    When the grandchild is not altruistic, the grandchild will not provide 
care to the adult child; that is, c- = 0. The adult child who does not expect 
to receive future elder care from the grandchild needs to save for his own 
future elder care. Suppose that the adult child receives greater monetary 
transfer from the elderly parent. Even if the adult child is altruistically 
concerned for the grandchild and the elderly parent, the adult child will 
increase neither the monetary transfer to the grandchild nor elder care to 
the elderly parent. The adult child ends up using the monetary transfer 
from the elderly parent to purchase an additional amount of market-
provided care for the adult child himself. By c- = 0, the condition (3) is 
rewritten by
As shown above, the marginal utility of market-provided care that the adult 
child purchases for his own future　      　　  is greater than the marginal 
utility of elder care that the adult child provides to the elderly parent 
　　　　　 Thus, when the adult child receives monetary transfer from 
the elderly parent gt, the adult child increases no elder care to the elderly 
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parent and ends up using the monetary transfer to purchase market-
provided care for the adult child himself mt+1. Moreover, as equation (1) 
implies, the adult child increases no monetary transfer to the grandchild.
    We have the following two propositions.
Proposition  1  Suppose that an adult child expects to receive elder care 
from a grandchild in period t+1. Then, the adult child will provide more 
money to the grandchild and a greater amount of elder care when the adult 
child receives greater monetary transfer from the elderly parent.
Proposition  2  Suppose that an adult child does not expect to receive elder 
care from a grandchild in period t+1. Then, the adult child will increase 
neither money to the grandchild nor elder care even when the adult child 
receives greater monetary transfer from the elderly parent.
    The two propositions show that the adult child's expectation of future 
elder care from the grandchild determines the effect of the increase in 
monetary transfer from the elderly parent to the adult child on the adult 
child's elder care provision to the elderly parent and monetary transfer to 
the grandchild.
    In the following sections, we empirically test the two propositions.
３. The HRS Sample
     In this section, the sample from the 1998 wave of the HRS that we used 
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is discussed. The HRS was launched in 1992; its respondents were born 
between 1931 and 1941 and were not institutionalized in 1992. In 1998, 
three cohorts were added to the original HRS: people born before 1923 (Asset 
and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old), people born between 1924 and 
1930 (Children of the Depression Era), and people born between 1942 and 
1947 (War Babies). To test the theoretical predictions proposed above, we 
needed information regarding the transfer of time between an adult child 
and his elderly parent and the transfer of money between the adult child 
and his child. The HRS provides the required information and is thus well 
suited to our study.
     We restrict the sample to households in which an adult child, an HRS 
respondent, has at least one child and for whom only one parent of the 
adult child is alive and needs help with basic personal activities, such as 
dressing, eating, or bathing. Moreover, we restrict the sample to households 
where at least one child lives away from the adult child because the 
information regarding whether the adult child or his spouse has any contact 
with his children is only available for households where at least one child 
lives away from the adult child. The sample drawn from the 1998 wave 
consists of 456 households. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for 
the variables used in the empirical analysis below.
４. Estimation and Discussion
    In this section, the propositions above are tested as hypotheses using the 
sample drawn from the HRS, and our empirical findings are reported. We 
separately test propositions 1 and 2. As discussed in Section 2, proposition 1 
predicts that among adult children who expect future elder care from their 
children, adult children increase the provision of elder care to their parents 
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and the transfer of money to their children when they receive greater 
monetary transfers from their elderly parents; proposition 2 predicts 
that among adult children who do not expect future elder care from their 
children, adult children increase neither the provision of elder care to their 
parents nor monetary transfers to their children when they receive greater 
monetary transfer from their elderly parents. We simultaneously estimate 
the decisions on the provision of elder care to his parent and the transfer of 
money to his children because the adult child simultaneously determines 
the provision of elder care to his parent and the transfer of money to his 
children. To this end, we separately estimate equation (4) for households 
where an adult child expects elder care from his children in the future and 
equation (5) for households where an adult child does not expect elder care 
in the future. To divide the households into these two samples, we use an 
indicator for whether an adult child or his spouse has any contact either 
in person, by phone, or by mail with at least one of his children in the 
preceding 12 months. The theoretical model shows that the adult child's 
child who is altruistic to the adult child will provide elder care to the adult 
child; we treat the contact between the adult child and his child as a proxy 
of altruism from his child to the adult child. Adult children who remain in 
contact with their children are more likely to expect future elder care from 
their children. In particular, we estimate equations (a) and (b) below using 
the recursive bivariate probit model:
    Let xit+1 denote the indicator for the positive amount of monetary transfer 
from an adult child (and his spouse) of household i to his children; the adult 
（a）
（b）
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child transfers a positive amount of monetary transfer to at least one of 
his children (including biological and stepchildren) during the two years 
preceding the interview date for the 1998 wave if x*it+1>0 and makes no 
monetary transfer otherwise. As for our construction of the variables on 
contact and monetary transfer from an adult child to his children, some 
readers may wonder whether there is a possibility that the adult child 
transfers money to the child with whom the adult child has no contact; 
that is, the adult child transfers money to the child from whom the adult 
child does not expect future elder care. Because parents would not transfer 
money to their children without any contact, the addressed concern is not 
likely to happen.
    Let git denote indicators for the number of years of schooling that the 
adult child has undergone. Specifically, we use two indicators: an indicator 
for whether the number of years of schooling is less than 12 years and 
an indicator for whether the number of years of schooling is equal to or 
greater than 16 years. In the model, git is considered the monetary transfer 
from the elderly parent to the adult child. It is difficult to find a proxy for 
the accumulated monetary transfers from the elderly parent to the adult 
child because the adult child has grown up. As a proxy for the monetary 
transfer, we use the number of years of schooling of the adult child. Becker 
(1991) discusses that children who inherit a sufficiently high level of 
human capital may inherit a large amount of nonhuman capital from their 
parents. This implies that adult children who have attended school for a 
greater number of years are more likely to have received a larger amount 
of money from their parents. The vector of the adult child's characteristics, 
Zit, consists of the adult child's age, gender, race, marital status, household 
wealth, household income, and number of children. The vector of the elderly 
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parent's characteristics, Yit, consists of the elderly parent's age, number 
of children, and years of schooling; in addition, Yit contains an indicator 
for whether the elderly parent owns a home, an indicator for whether the 
elderly parent cannot be left alone for an hour or more, an indicator for 
whether the financial situation of the elderly parent is better than that of 
the adult child, and an indicator for whether the financial situation of the 
elderly parent is worse than that of the adult child. Information regarding 
the indicator for whether the elderly parent owns a home and the indicator 
for the financial situation of the elderly parent tends to be missing; we 
add an indicator for whether the information is available. Let εi denote an 
unobserved component of the monetary transfer decision.
    Let cit denote the indicator for the transfer of a positive amount of 
time from the adult child to his elderly parent; the adult child transfers 
a positive amount of time to his elderly parent if c*it > 0 and makes no 
time transfer otherwise. To measure the time transfer, we use the hours 
spent helping the elderly parent with activities other than care, such as 
household chores, errands, and transportation during the preceding two 
years. Let 　　denote the number of sisters of the adult child; this variable 
is used as an instrumental variable for the transfer of time. The number of 
sisters is assumed to influence the transfer of time from the adult child to 
the elderly parent but not to influence the transfer of money from the adult 
child to his children. As discussed by McGarry (1998) and Brown (2006), 
provided the number of siblings is controlled for, the number of sisters is a 
strong determinant of whether an adult child will provide elder care to his 
parent. Let vi denote an unobserved component of the decision to transfer 
time.
    In equations (a) and (b), a pair of unobserved components, (ε,ν), 
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is assumed to have a zero mean, unit variance, and bivariate normal 
distribution and to be independent of ( g, Z, Y, and C S ). A correlation 
between ε and ν is denoted by ρ. If ρ ≠ 0, then estimates 　    　　　　　 
in the probit regression of the transfer of money from the adult child to his 
children will be inconsistent.
    Table 2 reports the bivariate probit model estimates for equations (a) and 
(b) in which adult children expect future elder care from their children. In 
the estimates for equation (a), we find that the coefficient on the indicator 
for whether the adult child is without a high school diploma is significantly 
negative at the one percent level. Therefore, adult children with a high 
school diploma or some college are more likely to provide monetary transfer 
to their children than those without a high school diploma. The coefficient 
on the household income of the adult child is significantly positive at the 
five percent level, and the coefficient on the household wealth of the adult 
child is also significantly positive at the 10 percent level. Adult children 
with greater household income and household wealth are more likely to 
provide monetary transfer to their children. We also find that the coefficient 
on the adult child's age is significantly negative at the five percent level. 
Thus, younger adult children are more likely to provide monetary transfers 
to their children; this result suggests that children of younger adult 
children tend to be younger than those of older adult children and need 
more financial support from their parents. In the estimates for equation (b), 
the coefficient on the indicator for whether the adult child is without a high 
school diploma is significantly negative at the 10 percent level. Therefore, 
adult children with a high school diploma or some college are more likely 
to provide elder care to their parents than those without a high school 
diploma. As mentioned above, the adult child's number of years of schooling 
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is a proxy for monetary transfer from the elderly parent to the adult child. 
Therefore, adult children who expect future elder care from their children 
provide more elder care to their parents and increase monetary transfers 
to their children when they receive greater monetary transfers from their 
elderly parents.
    Table 3 reports the bivariate probit model estimates for equations (a) 
and (b) in which adult children do not expect future elder care from their 
children. In the estimates for equation (a), neither the coefficient on the 
indicator for whether the adult child is without a high school diploma nor 
the coefficient on the indicator for whether the adult child is with four or 
more years of college is significant. We also find that the coefficients on the 
household income and household wealth of the adult child are insignificant. 
With regard to the estimates for equation (b), the coefficients on the adult 
child's years of schooling are statistically insignificant. Our estimates show 
that adult children who do not expect future elder care from their children 
increase neither the provision of elder care to their parents nor monetary 
transfers to their children when they receive greater monetary transfers 
from their parents. Due to collinearity, we are unable to derive the 
estimates for the coefficients on (1) the marital status of the adult children, 
(2) the indicator for the financial situation of elderly parents, and (3) the 
indicator for whether elderly parents own their home. ２
    In summary, among adult children who expect future elder care from 
their children, we find that adult children with a high school diploma 
２ Specifically, in the households where adult children do not expect future elder care, 
all of the adult children are married; information regarding whether elderly parents 
own their home is missing for almost all of the households, and all of the adult chil-
dren report that the financial situation of their elderly parent is the same as their 
own financial situation.
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or some college are more likely to provide elder care to their parents 
and monetary transfers to their children than adult children without 
a high school diploma. In contrast, among adult children who do not 
expect future elder care from their children, we find no statistically 
significant relationship between the education level of adult children and 
their monetary transfers to their children and also find no statistically 
significant relationship between the education level of adult children and 
their provision of elder care to their parents. These findings show that only 
adult children who expect future elder care from their children increase 
the provision of elder care to their parents and monetary transfers to 
their children when they receive greater monetary transfers from their 
elderly parents. Therefore, our findings are consistent with propositions 
1 and 2 and indicate that the expectations of adult children regarding 
whether their children will provide future elder care critically determine 
their decisions regarding the provision of elder care to their parents and 
monetary transfers to their children.
５. Concluding Remarks
    As the term “sandwiched generation” implies, adult children are 
struggling to strike the balance between providing elder care and bringing 
up their children. To provide a mechanism by which this generation strikes 
the balance between providing elder care and bringing up their children, 
we consider an economy in which adult children are concerned for their 
own well-being in their old age as well as the well-being of their elderly 
parents and the well-being of their children. By taking account of adult 
children's concern for their own elder care, this study treats the children 
of adult children as potential caregivers for the adult children. Then, 
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such adult children provide more elder care when they receive greater 
monetary transfers from their elderly parents. The adult children expect 
that their children will also provide a greater amount of elder care in their 
old age when the adult children are altruistic to their elderly parents. Our 
theoretical model examines whether such an expectation influences an 
adult child's decisions regarding the provision of elder care to his parent 
and monetary transfers to his child. Only if the adult child expects to 
receive elder care from his child in the future does our theoretical model 
predict that an adult child will provide a greater amount of elder care to 
his parent and greater monetary transfers to his child when he receives 
greater monetary transfers from his elderly parent. In other words, even if 
the adult child is altruistic to the elderly parent and the child of the adult 
child, the adult child increases neither elder care to the elderly parent nor 
the monetary transfer to the grandchild when the elderly parent transfers 
money to the adult child.
    Among adult children who expect future elder care from their children, 
we find that adult children increase monetary transfers to their children 
and provide more elder care to their parents when they receive greater 
monetary transfers from their elderly parents. In contrast, among adult 
children who do not expect future elder care from their children, we find 
that adult children neither increase monetary transfers to their children 
nor provide more elder care to their parents when they receive greater 
monetary transfers from their elderly parents. Therefore, our findings 
indicate that the expectation of adult children regarding whether their 
children will provide future elder care critically determines their decisions 
regarding the provision of elder care to their elderly parents and monetary 
transfers to their children.
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Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum S.D.
Adult child level
1 (any contact with at 
least one child) 0.739 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.439
1 (monetary transfer to 
children>0) 0.436 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.496
1 (helping hours>0) 0.429 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.495
1 (years of schooling<12) 0.258 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.438
1 (years of schooling≥16) 0.171 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.376
Age 60.747 60.000 44.000 79.000 6.286
Female 0.660 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.474
Race (other than white or 
black) 0.046 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.209
Race (black) 0.164 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.371
Household wealth 277,750 110,500 -162,524 4,961,000 557,058
Household annual income 51,528 29,700 0.000 1,367,591 89,367
Number of children 3.682 3.000 1.000 14.000 2.236
Number of sisters 1.563 1.000 0.000 8.000 1.513
Parent level
Years of schooling 9.365 9.000 0.000 17.000 3.722
1 (own a home | info. is 
available) 0.397 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.491
1 (info. on a home is avail-
able) 0.214 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.411
1 (financially better | 
info. is available) 0.231 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.424
1 (financially worse | info. 
is available) 0.505 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.502
1 (info. on financial situa-
tion is available ) 0.208 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.406
Age 86.464 86.000 67.000 105.000 6.755
Number of children 4.024 3.000 1.000 12.000 2.325
1 (can’t be left alone for 
≥1 hour) 0.438 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.496
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables used in estimation (N=456)
Two-Sided Transfers from Adult Children of Elderly Persons　Azuma・Fujiu
－21－
Table 2 : Bivariate probit model estimates where adult children expect future elder care (N=337)
Independent variable Monetary transfer  to children
Time transfer
to an elderly parent
1 (Time transfer>0) 0.241
(0.773)
Child’s number of sisters -0.113
(0.082)
Constant 0.836 1.825
(1.496) (1.158)
1(Child’s years of schooling<12) -0.697*** -0.369*
(0.225) (0.199)
1(Child’s years of schooling≥16) -0.119 0.137
(0.226) (0.208)
Child’s age -0.038** 0.007
(0.016) (0.016)
Child’s gender (female=1) 0.012 0.444**
(0.218) (0.173)
Child’s race (other than white or black) -0.823** -0.114
(0.369) (0.313)
Child’s race (black) -0.324 0.165
(0.193) (0.190)
Child’s marital status (married=1) -0.295 -0.025
(0.185) (0.175)
Child’s household wealth 0.043* 0.007
(measured in $100,000) (0.025) (0.023)
Child’s annual household income 0.058** -0.005
(measured in $10,000) (0.023) (0.019)
Child’s number of children 0.024 -0.059*
(0.038) (0.035)
Parent’s years of schooling -0.017 -0.032
(0.026) (0.023)
1 (Parent owns a home) 0.153 0.634**
(0.356) (0.312)
1 (Info. on a home is available) 6.330*** -6.144***
(0.453) (0.407)
1(Parent is financially better) 0.232 -0.604
(0.467) (0.414)
1(Parent is financially worse) 0.239 -0.226
(0.374) (0.348)
1 (Info. on a financial situation is available) -6.800*** 6.036***
(0.554) (0.420)
Parent’s age 0.019 -0.018
(0.016) (0.014)
Parent’s number of children -0.069 -0.061
(0.050) (0.057)
1(Parent can’t be left alone for ≥1 hour) -0.152 -0.286*
(0.169) (0.154)
Log likelihood = −394.476
ρ= 0.086  (0.451)
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10 percent, ** at the 5 percent, and *** at the 1 
percent level. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Bivariate probit model estimates where adult children don’t expect future elder care (N=119)
Independent variable Monetary transfer  to children
Time transfer
to an elderly parent
1 (Time transfer>0) -1.118
(1.181)
Child’s number of sisters -0.336*
(0.192)
Constant 0.614 1.534
(2.185) (1.910)
1(Child’s years of schooling<12) -0.168 -0.583
(0.479) (0.389)
1(Child’s years of schooling≥16) 0.423 -0.143
(0.484) (0.349)
Child’s age -0.027 -0.011
(0.023) (0.028)
Child’s gender (female=1) -0.005 0.173
(0.265) (0.272)
Child’s race (other than white or black) -6.250*** -4.714***
(0.514) (0.587)
Child’s race (black) 0.341 -0.285
(0.430) (0.431)
Child’s marital status (married=1) - -
Child’s household wealth -0.004 -0.012
(measured in $100,000) (0.015) (0.014)
Child’s annual household income 0.012 -0.011
(measured in $10,000) (0.014) (0.015)
Child’s number of children -0.057 -0.092
(0.067) (0.064)
Parent’s years of schooling 0.030 0.075
(0.050) (0.043)
1 (Parent owns a home) - -
1 (Info. on a home is available) - -
1(Parent is financially better) - -
1(Parent is financially worse) - -
1 (Info. on a financial situation is available) -7.353*** -6.186***
(0.545) (0.399)
Parent’s age 0.020 -0.012
(0.023) (0.024)
Parent’s number of children -0.086 0.131
(0.053) (0.109)
1(Parent can’t be left alone for ≥1 hour) -0.393* -0.291
(0.229) (0.244)
Log likelihood = −143.268
ρ= 0.671  (0.794)
Notes: * indicates significance at the 10 percent, ** at the 5 percent, and *** at the 1 
percent level. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
